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Poor versus rich countries: a gap in public
attitudes towards fiscal solidarity in the EU
Sofia Vasilopoulou and Liisa Talving
Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK
ABSTRACT
Existing research has primarily focused on the role of utility and identity in
shaping individuals’ European Union (EU) preferences. This article argues that
macroeconomic context is a crucial predictor of attitudes towards trans-
national financial assistance, which has been omitted from previous analyses.
Using data from the 2014 European Election Studies (EES) Voter Study for 28
EU member states, this article demonstrates that citizens living in poorer EU
countries are less willing to support fiscal solidarity than their counterparts in
more affluent countries. Country affluence serves as a heuristic, moderating
the relationship between individual-level utility and identity considerations
and willingness to show solidarity to member states with economic difficul-
ties. When a country does not fare well economically, citizens’ views on pro-
viding help to others remain negative, irrespective of individual-level
utilitarian and identity considerations. Our findings have implications for
understanding the decision-making calculus underlying preference formation.
KEYWORDS Attitudes; fiscal solidarity; macroeconomic conditions; utility; identity
The financial crisis signalled a new period in the process of European
integration (Vasilopoulou 2013). It revealed that European Union (EU)
policy outcomes are no longer Pareto-efficient, whereby some European
citizens would benefit but no one would be made worse off (Eichenberg
and Dalton 2007). Redistribution across the EU has been taking place for
decades, for example in the form of permanent transfers such as struc-
tural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (Mattila 2006).
However, during the crisis EU financial assistance was severely politicised.
Despite the one-off and interest-bearing nature of bailouts, they were
often translated into a question of EU solidarity. Against this background,
this article is concerned with the extent to which European citizens are
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prepared to engage in a collective response to EU member states’ eco-
nomic problems. Existing literature has addressed this question primarily
through a focus on individuals’ social dispositions, including identity and
cosmopolitanism. The key finding is that culturally open individuals are
more likely to also be supportive of international bailouts (Bechtel et al.
2014; Kuhn et al. 2017; Verhaegen 2018). Other perspectives relate to the
effect of party cues, elite dissent, left–right economic ideology (Kleider
and Stoeckel 2019; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018) and the role of regional fac-
tors, such as corruption and quality of governance (Bauhr and Charron
2018). None of the above contributions focus on the role of context in shap-
ing support for transnational financial assistance. This is surprising given
that the costs and benefits of within-EU financial assistance differ from one
member state to another. We contend that a country’s macroeconomic situ-
ation serves as a heuristic shaping the extent to which citizens are willing to
share resources. We advance the literature by – for the first time – examin-
ing the mechanisms underlying the direct relationship between macroeco-
nomic context and preferences for offering financial assistance to EU
member states in need. We further theorise the moderating effect of context
on the relationship between individual-level utility and identity considera-
tions on the one hand, and support for financial assistance on the other.
We posit that citizen preferences for transnational financial assistance
relate to an evaluation of how their state may be affected by offering such
help. Citizens living in poorer member states do not view within-EU
solidary measures as a collective responsibility, but rather as primarily the
obligation of richer member states. They are less likely to support offering
transnational financial assistance to member states in need, although their
countries may potentially become recipients of such funds. If they con-
tribute towards assisting another EU member state, they will have to
share scarce domestic financial resources. If, on the other hand, they
receive external financial assistance, they will have to abide by EU condi-
tionality, which is associated with austerity and could potentially place
them at a competitive disadvantage. Crucially, the domestic context mod-
erates the impact of key individual-level explanations, including utility
and identity, on citizen support for transnational financial assistance. In
poorer EU member states, citizens oppose financial assistance irrespective
of utility and identity factors. Put differently, the relationship between
individual-level utility and identity considerations, on the one hand, and
preferences for transnational financial assistance, on the other, is only a
rich-country phenomenon.
We test our hypotheses using data from the 2014 European Election
Studies (EES) Voter Study for 28 EU member states. Incorporating con-
text yields substantial theoretical and empirical insights. First, by showing
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that public opinion reflects country-level divides, often irrespective of
individual-level utility and identity considerations, our work casts serious
doubt on classical rational and cultural theories of attitude formation and
political choice. We show that economic prosperity matters directly in
explaining support for offering financial assistance to EU countries in
need. This runs counter to literature that finds no significant effects of
macroeconomic contextual variables on citizen attitudes towards such
assistance (e.g. Bauhr and Charron 2018; Daniele and Geys 2015). The
article demonstrates the limitations of identity and utilitarian theories: in
poorer EU member states support for cross-border transfer of resources is
evenly low irrespective of personal economic and affective considerations.
This finding calls for a significant revision of the two core approaches of
preference formation. Second, we empirically show that the structure of
citizens’ attitudes towards offering financial assistance to EU member
states in economic difficulties does not fully reflect that of general prefer-
ences for European integration. The same individuals in different coun-
tries might support European integration but may not be prepared to
support potentially costly policies. We thus establish the importance of
examining Euroscepticism through its different dimensions, and the
existence of conflicting policy preferences among European citizens. Our
findings have important implications for policy debates, pointing to the
difficulty of addressing Euroscepticism with a one-size-fits-all strategy.
Modelling support for fiscal solidarity: the role of domestic
economic prosperity
Whereas bailouts related to the euro crisis might have been prominent in
media and political discussions, the EU has provided financial assistance
to both Eurozone and non-Eurozone member states. Within the context
of the European Monetary Union (EMU), member states have established
intergovernmental stabilisation mechanisms, such as the European
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and later the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) to preserve financial stability across the euro
area. Unlike contributions to the EU budget, this financial assistance does
not relate to net fiscal transfers. It takes the form of a loan linked to
macroeconomic conditionality ‘to ensure that Member States receiving
such assistance implement the necessary fiscal, economic, structural and
supervisory reforms’.1 In the context of the ESM, these loans constitute
an implicit form of risk sharing, as the ESM has an AAAþ rating.
Countries can borrow at lower interest rates, but – to the extent that
loans are repaid – debtor countries can also make profits (De Grauwe
and Ji 2013). Although member states contribute to the EU’s
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programmes, acting as guarantors, the ESM raises the funds that it lends
through the financial markets, which gives the EU the role of a
‘borrower’. The EU has also set up programmes of assistance to non-
EMU member states, offering Balance of Payments assistance in the form
of loans. To date, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Romania,
Hungary and Latvia have participated in various EU-managed financial pro-
grammes, often in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). These programmes and bailout packages should not be confused with
permanent EU transfers and redistributive polices (see e.g. Mattila 2006).
Our point of departure is that country context is key to understanding
preferences for transnational financial assistance. Donors and beneficiaries
are first and foremost governments and countries, rather than individuals or
groups of individuals. Countries that receive external financial assistance do
not allocate that funding to the benefit of a specific social class. Cross-border
financial assistance in the EU aims to address imbalances at the country level,
rather than income inequality at the individual or group levels. During the
crisis, the key question related to whether those EU member states with a cur-
rent account surplus would bail out those facing severe economic and finan-
cial difficulties. Similarly, in the context of foreign aid, typically prosperous
countries tend to give higher amounts of financial assistance measured as a
percentage of their GDP compared to struggling economies (Chong and
Gradstein 2008).
This suggests that an individual’s probability to oppose or support fis-
cal aid requires taking into account geographic variation. We posit that
citizens employ the national macroeconomic context, and specifically
wealth, in order to assess the costs and benefits of such financial assist-
ance. Our approach speaks directly to research that focuses on the domes-
tic foundations of international politics and shows that the national
context has a ‘cueing’ or ‘benchmarking’ effect on how Europeans evalu-
ate the EU, its institutions and policies (De Vries 2017; Rohrschneider
2002; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000).
Specifically, this literature suggests that domestic political institutions and
performance are important antecedents of EU preferences. The EU tends
to be too complicated and too distant for the majority of citizens, who
form their preferences using information shortcuts provided by their
domestic context (Anderson 1998). For example, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000)
finds that the EU project is more attractive to individuals who live in
countries with higher levels of corruption. European integration becomes
a solution to domestic problems that cannot be resolved within the nation
state. In addition, citizens in countries with high-quality domestic institu-
tions tend to be more Eurosceptic and more dissatisfied with EU democ-
racy (Hobolt 2012; Rohrschneider 2002).
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National conditions matter because they serve as benchmarks against
which the EU is judged (De Vries 2017; Hobolt 2012). Examining
specifically the effect of national economic conditions on EU support, the
literature has pointed towards two directions. On the one hand, assuming
that European integration is associated with prosperity, as a country’s
standard of living increases, its citizens are expected to become more pro-
EU (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; see Gabel and Whitten 1997 for mixed
results). This relationship was observed during the pre-Maastricht period
(Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). On the other hand, given that poorer mem-
ber states are the main beneficiaries of EU funds, their citizens tend to be
more pro-EU compared to those living in net contributor countries
(Anderson and Reichert 1995; Hooghe and Marks 2006; although Hobolt
2012 finds no effect of growth and net EU transfers on satisfaction with EU
democracy). In sum, the intuition is that when national political and eco-
nomic institutions work poorly, people tend to be more supportive of the
EU, and this relationship is especially strong in the post-Maastricht period.
We also posit that individuals employ cues from their domestic eco-
nomic context in order to evaluate whether they support their country’s
contribution to EU-wide fiscal solidarity. Citizens are sensitive to their
collective economic circumstances. However, our intuition regarding the
effect on preferences for within-EU aid is the reverse. We argue that citi-
zens living in less affluent EU member states are likely to oppose trans-
national financial assistance initiatives for two reasons. First, poorer
countries tend to have more severe budgetary constraints. As such, their
citizens may perceive national resources as scarce and prefer to spend
them domestically (Lengfeld et al. 2015: 9–10). This is in line with work
that expects that, in Germany, support for international bailouts ‘should
be lower in net receiving regions, since residents might worry that inter-
national financial transfers would come at the expense of transfers to their
own region’ (Bechtel et al. 2014: 838; see also Gomez 2015; Kleider and
Stoeckel 2019; Kuhn et al. 2017). Note that Slovakia, an EU peripheral
and relatively unprosperous country, opposed expanding the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) mechanism under the justification that
it was an expensive measure.2
Second, we know that domestic conditions affect the salience and pol-
iticisation of issues in a given country (Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010).
EU programmes of financial assistance are often tied to tough conditions
and external intervention in a member state’s domestic finances. Citizens
in poorer countries – which are potential recipients of fiscal aid – are
likely to more prominently consider the austerity-related effects of such
assistance. Austerity is often linked to slower economic growth, down-
ward pressures on domestic welfare spending, unemployment, and a
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general deterioration of citizens’ wellbeing. This is in line with Nicoli
(2019) who finds that citizens living in countries in financial distress are
more likely to oppose measures towards European economic governance,
as these entail further austerity measures and fiscal supervision. We also
know that the EU’s legitimacy has been undermined in crisis-ridden
countries where the decline of trust in the EU has been particularly severe
(Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Foster and Frieden 2017).
If a country’s inability to absorb the shock of an economic crisis is
considered to be partly related to structural imbalances inherent in the
EU system, then the citizens of poorer countries might see that it is the
obligation of wealthier member states to address such imbalances by bear-
ing the costs of bailing out countries in severe economic difficulties.
Therefore, citizens in poorer member states view EU fiscal aid with scep-
ticism. If they pay towards assisting another country, they will have to
share precious and finite domestic financial resources; if they end up
receiving assistance, they will have to abide by EU conditionality, which
could potentially place them at a substantial competitive disadvantage.
H1: Citizens in poorer EU member states are less likely to support offering
financial help to EU member states in severe economic and financial
difficulties.
The conditioning effect of a member state’s economic prosperity
The direct effect of a member state’s economic prosperity is only part of
the story. Citizens may experience the same economic conditions but may
perceive them differently depending on their individual dispositions. We
argue that country affluence may also moderate the relationship between
individual-level considerations and willingness to show solidarity to mem-
ber states with economic difficulties. The literature puts forward at least
two key theories at the individual level that may explain such preferences,
i.e. utility and identity (Bechtel et al. 2014; Hobolt and De Vries 2016).
We advance the literature by showing that the relationship of two key
models of preference formation to attitudes towards transnational finan-
cial assistance is nuanced.
Subjective economic evaluations are likely to influence an individual’s
attitude towards the EU (e.g. Anderson and Reichert 1995; Braun and
Tausendpfund 2014; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel and Whitten 1997;
Hooghe and Marks 2006; Serrichio et al. 2013). Here we may distinguish
between sociotropic and egocentric perspectives. Citizens who do not feel
confident about their country’s economy are less likely to support integra-
tion (e.g. Anderson 1998; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Hooghe and Marks
2006). In addition, the human capital hypothesis suggests that citizens in
different socioeconomic situations may experience integration differently,
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with those with low levels of human capital (low-skilled; low-educated)
less likely to support the EU (e.g. Gabel 1998a; Gabel and Palmer 1995;
Hooghe and Marks 2006; Serrichio et al. 2013). Applying these perspectives
to the context of attitudes towards transnational financial assistance, we
similarly expect that citizens who negatively evaluate their national economy
and those with low levels of human capital will oppose the policy. This is
simply because such individuals are likely to perceive a much more intense
resource conflict between domestic and international redistribution.3
These mechanisms, however, are expected to work differently across
member states based on country affluence. The material costs to the
national economy might weaken the impact of individual-level considera-
tions. In poorer member states, individuals who negatively evaluate their
country’s economy and those with lower levels of human capital are not
the only ones unlikely to support offering financial help to EU member
states in severe economic and financial difficulties. Given that resources
are particularly scarce in poorer EU member states, we suggest that peo-
ple may oppose offering financial assistance to another country irrespect-
ive of their evaluations of the economy and their socioeconomic
placement. In such countries, the majority of citizens may be concerned
about the economic costs of bailouts on the country as a whole – even
those with a positive outlook of the national economy. In addition, aus-
terity and cuts do not only negatively affect individuals with low levels of
human capital. Downward pressures on the economy can also affect those
educated individuals in managerial positions who may see a relative
decline in their incomes and purchasing power.
H2: Individual-level utility effects on support for fiscal solidarity are weaker
in poor EU member states.
Going beyond the utilitarian argument, research has shown that affect-
ive factors have a strong effect in understanding people’s preferences (see
Bechtel et al. 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Lengfeld et al. 2015). Factors
related to cultural openness, such as cosmopolitanism (Bechtel et al.
2014), identity (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014) and moral reasoning (Lengfeld
et al. 2015) may affect willingness to support transnational assistance.
General feelings of cosmopolitanism are dispositions that may positively
affect attitudes towards economic openness in terms of both trade and
immigration (e.g. see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). In addition, feelings
of European identity, or inclusive forms of nationalism more generally,
positively relate to support for the EU and European economic govern-
ance (e.g. see Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kuhn and Stoeckel
2014; McLaren 2002). Affective attitudes toward European integration are
closely related to citizens’ willingness to make sacrifices to help other
member states (Gabel 1998b). We also anticipate weak feelings of
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European identity to be negatively correlated with support for offering
financial help to EU member states that need it.
We expect, however, that domestic macroeconomic context dampens
the effect of identity. We posit that the identity dimension of attitudes
towards fiscal solidarity will have smaller effects in poor countries. This is
because the perceived costs of transnational financial assistance will out-
weigh the impact of European attachment. In poorer member states,
domestic economic conditions may act as a ‘buffer’ diluting the effect of
identity on support for providing financial assistance to the EU’s strug-
gling economies (Garry and Tilley 2009; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014).
H3: Individual-level identity effects on support for fiscal solidarity are weaker
in poor EU member states.
Data and methods
In order to test the theoretical expectations, we use individual-level data
from the EES Voter Study 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2015) for 28 EU member
states combined with country-level macroeconomic data. The EES Voter
Study is an EU-wide survey carried out using a nationally representative
sample of approximately 1000 interviews in each member state. The
total sample size in the analysis is 30,064 respondents. The interviews
were conducted in May and June 2014. Although the study has been
carried out every five years since 1979, this is the first time that the
respondents were explicitly asked to indicate their attitudes towards fis-
cal solidarity. This entails that the analysis lacks a time dimension by
design. While driven by data availability, we acknowledge that relying
on a single cross-section remains a major limitation of this study.
However, we think that the timing of the survey allows us to make valid
inferences on preferences for cross-national fiscal solidarity because it
coincided with the discussion on whether Greece should receive add-
itional financial support from international institutions, which was a
highly politicised question. While we are not able to directly test the
extent to which citizen opinions may change over time, previous
research indicates that the salience of monetary integration, amplified by
the euro crisis, is positively correlated with stable informed opinions
(Hobolt and Wratil 2015). The topic continues to be relevant against the
ongoing debate over establishing a euro area fiscal union. The survey
question was formulated as follows:
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In
times of crisis, it is desirable for the [country] to give financial help to
another European Union Member State facing severe economic and
financial difficulties.
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The answers were given on a four-point scale (totally agree, tend to
agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree). Due to our substantive interest
in opposition to fiscal solidarity, we recoded the variable as binary, where
0¼ agree and 1¼ disagree. ‘Don’t knows’ are excluded (for descriptive
statistics see Online Appendix A1).4 To test the robustness of our results,
we replicate the analyses using an alternative dependent variable, measur-
ing general opposition to the EU. The reason for this is to test the possi-
bility that public preferences for the general direction of European
integration differ from those for specific EU-related issues (Vasilopoulou
and Talving 2019). To measure EU support, we utilise a survey item,
which asks respondents whether they consider their country’s member-
ship of the EU a good thing, a bad thing, or neither. The variable was
recoded in a similar manner to our original dependent variable, with 1
referring to negative attitudes and 0 to all other categories. ‘Don’t knows’
are excluded. The correlation between the two dependent variables is
weak (r¼ 0.20),5 suggesting that attitudes towards fiscal solidarity differ
from general EU opinion.
We test the aggregate-level economic explanation (H1) by relying on a
country’s macroeconomic situation, measured as GDP per capita in the
year prior to survey fieldwork. We utilise Eurostat statistics on GDP per
capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), which allows for meaningful
volume comparisons between countries. Before modelling, log-transform-
ation was used for the variable to improve the normality of the distribu-
tion. This also allows us to consider the possibility that the relationship
between GDP levels and the outcome variable is non-linear. As a robust-
ness check, we run the models using payments from the EU budget as a
proxy for the domestic economic situation. We expect that citizens in
countries that have received more financial benefits from the EU are
more likely to consider the austerity-related effects of such assistance and
are therefore more opposed to it. To test this, we use a measure of oper-
ating budgetary balance (OBB) (percentage of Gross National Income
[GNI], 2013), which reflects the difference between what a country
receives from and pays into the EU budget.6 A negative budgetary balance
indicates that a country contributes more to the EU budget than it
receives from it, and a positive balance that it receives more than it con-
tributes, i.e. the direction of this variable is opposite to the GDP variable.
Log-transformation is also used for this variable. The results of the mod-
els using OBB are presented in Online Appendix A2. We finally replicate
the findings using two more robustness checks, where country macroeco-
nomic context is operationalised using Eurostat data for the unemploy-
ment rate (for 2013) as well as GDP per capita change (from the crisis
year of 2007). The results appear in Online Appendix A3.
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The utilitarian dimension of attitudes towards transnational financial
assistance (H2) is operationalised at the sociotropic level using subjective
perceptions of national economic performance. Respondents were asked
to assess whether – compared to 12months ago – the economic situation
in their country has become a lot better, a little better, stayed the same,
become a little worse, or a lot worse. This is a standard measure of eco-
nomic positions in economic voting studies (Lewis-Beck 1988). Although
a bulk of evidence confirms that perceptions of the national economy
influence political attitudes more than personal material wellbeing (e.g.
Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014 on support for European economic integration;
Mansfield and Mutz 2009 on attitudes towards free trade; Stegmaier and
Lewis-Beck 2013 on political support), we also test the utilitarian explan-
ation at the egocentric level. Unfortunately, survey data do not include
personal economic assessments; therefore, we operationalise the egocentric
dimension via educational attainment and occupational skills. We assume
that higher education and better occupational skills lead to higher levels
of human capital. Level of education is measured with number of years
spent in full-time education. The answers were recoded into categories
‘no full-time education’, ‘up to 15 years’, ‘16 to 19 years’ and ‘20 years or
older’. Respondents still studying were assigned to these categories
according to their actual age. Occupational status is measured using the
pre-coded categories included in the EES Voter Study, including self-
employed, managers, other white-collar workers, manual workers, house
persons, unemployed, retired, and students. These categories are added as
dummy variables.
The identity dimension (H3) is operationalised via attachment to
Europe. Respondents in the survey were asked to indicate whether they
feel attached to Europe, using a scale where 1¼ yes, definitely, 2¼ yes, to
some extent, 3¼ not really, and 4¼ not at all. We reversed the scale, with
higher values indicating a stronger feeling of European identity.
Drawing from the international redistribution and Euroscepticism liter-
atures, the models include standard sociodemographic controls, e.g. age
(in full years), gender (0¼male, 1¼ female), and social class (1¼ the
lowest and 10¼ the highest level in society). We control for ideology
through respondents’ self-placement on the left–right scale (0¼ left,
10¼ right), as preferences for within-EU fiscal aid might be absorbed by
the traditional ideological conflict. We additionally employ a squared
term of left–right ideology as we expect the effect to be curvilinear, with
support for fiscal solidarity being lower among citizens placed at the
fringes of the political spectrum. Similar patterns have been observed in
studies on international redistribution (e.g. Bechtel et al. 2014) and EU
attitudes (e.g. Steenbergen et al. 2007). We further include a control
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variable that measures preference for domestic redistribution of wealth to
account for the possibility that support for redistribution between coun-
tries reflects support for redistribution between individuals (e.g. Kleider
and Stoeckel 2019). We also control for domestic proxies to account for
the possibility that fiscal solidarity reflects approval of the national gov-
ernment (Armingeon and Ceka 2014). At the aggregate level, we include
a dummy for countries that received financial assistance from the EU to
adjust for possible confounding effects on support for fiscal solidarity.7
The dichotomous nature of our main and alternative dependent variables
requires the use of logistic regression modelling. To account for the clustered
structure of data where respondents are nested within countries, we employ
multilevel modelling techniques.
Results
Descriptive data show that on average 45% of respondents disagreed that
in times of crisis it is desirable for their country to give financial help to
EU member states in economic and financial difficulties; 50.8% agreed
with the statement and 4.2% did not take a position. These attitudes vary
greatly across countries. In Slovakia, for instance, 67.1% of respondents
indicated their opposition to fiscal solidarity, whereas in Sweden only
16.1% shared similar views (Figure 1). We may also observe that com-
pared to Western Europe, opposition to providing financial aid is stronger
among the Southern and Eastern member states which would potentially
benefit more from solidarity measures. Attitudes towards solidarity meas-
ures clearly differ from EU opinions more generally. At 13.8%, opposition
to the EU is much lower compared to nearly half of Europeans disap-
proving of fiscal aid. Patterns of country variation diverge between the
two dependent variables as well, with levels of overall Euroscepticism
being highest in Britain and lowest in Estonia. These tendencies indicate
that the two items do not capture different facets of the same reality, but
that they are indeed separate phenomena.
Moving on to the multilevel logistic regression analyses, we examine
how competing sets of explanations influence attitudes towards providing
help to countries in difficulties. Results of the additive model are pre-
sented in Model 1 in Table 1. At the contextual level, we firstly test the
impact of the national macroeconomic situation on the likelihood of sup-
porting fiscal solidarity (H1). The results suggest that support levels are
indeed partly determined by country affluence. Citizens living in wealthy
countries are less opposed to fiscal assistance than their counterparts in
poorer member states where domestic resources are limited (see also
Kuhn et al. 2017; Lengfeld et al. 2015). Substantive interpretation of the
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results is eased by looking at average marginal effects, which at –0.12 sug-
gest that the likelihood of opposing fiscal solidarity decreases by 0.12 per-
centage points with every one-unit increase in the logged GDP per capita
variable. However, since the model is non-linear and thus the marginal
effect may not be constant across all levels of country affluence, we focus
our interpretation on predicted probabilities for specific values of the
wealth variable. For instance in Bulgaria, which is the poorest country in
the sample, the mean predicted probability of opposing fiscal solidarity is
53%, but the likelihood remains much lower at 33% in the wealthiest
country, Luxembourg. Note that the mean predicted probability of reject-
ing transnational financial assistance is rather high in countries where the
wealth levels remain below average even if they have received financial
assistance, e.g. Latvia (49%) and Greece (48%).
At the individual level, we are interested in utilitarian and identity con-
cerns. In line with previous findings (e.g. Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014), the
utilitarian dimension demonstrates significant effects mostly at the
sociotropic level: citizens who positively evaluate the economy are more
supportive of fiscal aid, whereas negative assessments of the economy lead
to scepticism towards helping other countries. One of the two egocentric
measures, i.e. education, yields significant effects: compared to less-educated
Figure 1. Opposition to the EU and to providing financial help to other member
states; by country.
Source: EES Voter Study 2014.
Note: colour version available on line.
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Table 1. Models of opposition to fiscal solidarity.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Individual-level
variables
Economy a lot worse 0.45 2.60 0.45
(0.06) (0.82) (0.06)
Economy a little worse 0.25 1.43 0.25
(0.04) (0.58) (0.04)
Economy a little better 0.20 0.21 0.20
(0.04) (0.62) (0.04)
Economy a lot better 0.41 0.20 0.41
(0.13) (2.18) (0.13)
Self-employed 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Managers 0.13 0.13 0.12
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Other white collar workers 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Manual workers 0.14 0.15 0.14
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
House person 0.19 0.19 0.19
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Retired 0.13 0.13 0.13
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Students 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
No full-time education 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Medium education 0.17 0.17 0.16
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
High education 0.43 0.43 0.43
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Not really attached
to Europe
0.41 0.40 0.50
(0.06) (0.06) (0.92)
Somewhat attached
to Europe
0.92 0.92 2.62
(0.06) (0.06) (0.85)
Definitely attached
to Europe
1.35 1.34 3.55
(0.06) (0.06) (0.89)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Social class 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Left–right 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Left–right2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Approves
government’s record
0.49 0.49 0.48
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Preferences for domestic
redistribution
0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Country-level
variables
GDP per capita logged 0.56 0.71 0.12
(0.25) (0.25) (0.30)
Bailout country 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Cross-level
interactions
Economy a lot worse
# GDP
– 0.69 –
(0.19)
Economy a little worse
# GDP
– 0.38 –
(0.13)
(continued)
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individuals, citizens with medium and high levels of education are much
less likely to reject transnational financial assistance. Occupational skills,
however, play a smaller role in attitude formation. The results also indicate
that identity helps explain variation in opposition to fiscal assistance, with
stronger attachment to Europe yielding lower levels of resistance. On aver-
age, then, preferences are determined by economic and cultural attitudes at
the individual level, as well as levels of prosperity at the national level. In
addition, the outcome is associated with some of the control variables, such
as social class, ideological dispositions and government approval.8
Considering the large contextual variation in attitudes towards trans-
national financial assistance, we next examine the moderating effects of
country affluence on individual-level considerations. We expect to find
weaker socioeconomic (H2) and identity (H3) effects in poor member
states. To test this, we include interaction terms between GDP per capita
and micro-level measures of the socioeconomic and identity dimensions.
The results for our key economic variable, i.e. national economic percep-
tions, are shown in Model 2 in Table 1 and on the upper panel of Figure
2. Economic issues influence views on fiscal solidarity differently depend-
ing on the affluence of a country that a person lives in. In countries with
low levels of wealth, attitudes are not defined by utilitarian concerns.
Average marginal effects largely fall on the zero line, indicating that the
effects are not statistically significant. In richer countries, in turn, opin-
ions are conditional on individual-level economic factors: opposition to
fiscal solidarity varies across population strata, being highest among
Table 1. Continued.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Economy a little better
# GDP
– 0.09 –
(0.14)
Economy a lot better
# GDP
– 0.13 –
(0.47)
Not really attached to
Europe # GDP
– – 0.02
(0.20)
Somewhat attached to
Europe # GDP
– – 0.79
(0.19)
Definitely attached to
Europe # GDP
– – 1.09
(0.20)
Constant 3.42 4.11 0.38
(1.16) (1.16) (1.37)
Observations 19,795 19,795 19,795
Number
of groups
28 28 28
Log likelihood 11,974 11,962 11,938
Source: EES Voter Study 2014.
Notes: Multilevel logistic regression models; respondents nested in countries. Entries are regression
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: economic situation in country
stayed the same; unemployed; low education; not at all attached to Europe.
p< 0.01; p< 0.05; p< 0.10.
14 S. VASILOPOULOU AND L. TALVING
Figure 2. Individual-level effects on opposition to fiscal solidarity by GDP per cap-
ita categories.
Source: EES Voter Study 2014.
Notes: Average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Reference categories: economic situ-
ation in country stayed the same; not at all attached to Europe.
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people with negative economic assessments (Figure 2). The substantive
importance of the results is emphasised by predicted probabilities. In
Luxembourg, the wealthiest country in the sample, the mean predicted
probability of rejecting fiscal solidarity ranges from 20% to 54% depend-
ing on respondents’ economic evaluations. In Bulgaria, however, the
country with lowest GDP levels, the chances of opposing fiscal aid reach
48–55%, irrespective of personal economic considerations. Put differently,
citizens who consider the economy a lot better than a year ago, i.e. the
group that is typically expected to support European integration, have a
20% likelihood of opposing fiscal solidarity in Luxembourg, but as high
as 48% in Bulgaria. Similarly, optimistic economic perceptions are associ-
ated with a much higher probability of rejecting fiscal aid in Greece
(39%) and Latvia (42%) than they are in wealthy countries, for example
Germany or Sweden (both 30%). In short, in less affluent member states
opposition is strong across all economic appraisal groups.
Similar patterns appear when we look at egocentric measures of the
utilitarian dimension. In wealthy countries, people in certain occupational
categories that are associated with higher levels of human capital, such as
students, are significantly less likely to express pessimistic views on fiscal
solidarity compared to their counterparts in other occupational groups. In
poorer member states, however, occupational status fails to explain vari-
ation in the dependent variable (Model 1 in Online Appendix A5). The
results are even clearer when we operationalise the human capital dimen-
sion using educational attainment. Belonging to the highest educational
group significantly decreases the likelihood of opposing fiscal solidarity in
rich countries but does not distinguish between support levels in member
states with scarce financial resources (Model 2 in Online Appendix A5).
Next, we explore contextual variation in identity effects. Model 3 in
Table 1 and the lower panel of Figure 2 demonstrate that, similar to eco-
nomic issues, affective attitudes only explain variation in disapproval of
fiscal assistance in countries with high GDP. In Luxembourg, which is the
wealthiest country in the sample, predicted probabilities range from 17%
for people with strong European identity to 67% for those who do not
identify with Europe at all. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, which is the
poorest country, the probability of opposing transnational financial assist-
ance remains high at 49–62%, with no substantial differences between
groups. Citizens are very likely to reject fiscal solidarity also in poorer
debtor countries such as Greece and Latvia even if they strongly identify
with Europe (39% and 42%, respectively). The same cannot be said about
wealthy countries such as Germany (28%) or Sweden (27%), where a
strong European identity clearly lowers opposition.9 These results are in
line with Verhaegen (2018), who demonstrates that respondents with
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strong European identity who live in crisis-ridden countries do not sup-
port offering financial help to countries in need.
Our argument on contextual variation is centred on the notion that
citizens in less prosperous countries are likely to reject fiscal solidarity
because they are reluctant to share domestic resources that are already
scarce. The second part of our argument posits that views on trans-
national financial assistance are related to poor countries potentially being
on the receiving end of that assistance. EU conditionality is associated
with harsh and widely unpopular austerity measures. Our analysis thus
far focuses on a country’s socioeconomic standing as a proxy for domestic
context. To directly address the second part of the argument, we test the
robustness of the results by utilising a measure of payments from the EU
budget. We expect to find that – similar to countries with low levels of
wealth – residents in member states that have received more financial
benefits from the EU express scepticism towards fiscal solidarity, irre-
spective of their personal economic and affective positions. The results in
Models 1 and 2 in Online Appendix A2 suggest that this is the case. With
significant interaction effects in both models, the results show that indi-
vidual-level economic and identity effects are dampened when a country’s
operating balance budget is high, i.e. it is a net receiver of EU budgetary
payments. Under such circumstances, poor economic perceptions and
weak attachment to Europe do not define opposition to fiscal aid as
clearly as they do in member states that are net contributors to the EU
budget. Finally, we repeat the analyses using economic growth from the
crisis year as well as unemployment rate as two alternative indicators of
the domestic context. The results by and large confirm our key findings:
individual considerations differentiate between attitudes towards fiscal aid
in those European countries that have positive economic growth or low
unemployment, but are not sufficient to explain variation in others, i.e.
those member states with large negative economic growth or high
unemployment (Online Appendix A3).
Our findings suggest that views on fiscal solidarity differ from those on
EU integration more generally. We have shown that in poor member
states, resistance to offering financial assistance is homogenously high,
even among population segments that are typically considered optimistic
towards EU integration, such as those with better socioeconomic status
and strong attachment to Europe. We carried out an additional test to
account for the possibility that attitudes towards financial assistance and
EU support are two separate phenomena. We repeated the analyses
using opposition to a country’s membership of the EU as the dependent
variable. Comparing the models for both dependent variables, we would
expect to find different patterns of support and opposition. Models 1
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and 2 in Online Appendix A6 mostly support this expectation. Unlike
in the fiscal solidarity models, there are no contextual differences in the
extent to which economic opinions determine opposition to the EU.
Quite the contrary, economic effects perform in a similar manner in
poor and in wealthy countries, with negative economic assessments
leading to higher levels of Euroscepticism. The identity effects some-
what resemble those found in fiscal solidarity models in that strong
attachment to Europe does distinguish between EU attitudes in coun-
tries with higher GDP levels, but the impact remains smaller compared
to that in our original models. Altogether, our analysis indicates that in
contrast to general support for EU integration, which can be mostly
explained at the individual level, attitudes towards fiscal aid are
embedded in between-country differences, thus creating different sup-
port patterns across member states. This suggests that it is important to
examine public opinion on specific EU-related issues separately from
general EU support because attitudes are structured differently across
these dimensions.
Discussion
This article has theorised and empirically substantiated the effect of con-
text on public attitudes towards offering financial help to EU member
states in need. First, we find polarisation of attitudes between richer and
poorer member states. Citizens in countries that are economically worse
off show significantly lower levels of support for providing financial
assistance to the EU’s struggling economies, even though these are the
countries that would presumably benefit more from it. This is because,
given resource scarcity, individuals in poorer countries prioritise the
domestic compared to the transnational level. In such countries, in add-
ition, programmes of external financial assistance are more likely to be
associated with austerity and downward pressures on social spending.
Second, individuals with similar predispositions but living in different
countries take widely varying views on fiscal solidarity. Micro-level utility
and identity considerations do not impact upon preferences for trans-
national financial assistance in poorer countries. This relationship is a
rich country phenomenon. In wealthy countries the individual-level socio-
economic and cultural divide is sharper, whereas in poorer member states
providing financial aid to others is perceived – by all social groups – as
an unnecessary burden to an economy that is already under strain.
We have proposed that attitudes towards EU fiscal solidarity should
be better understood through the prism of contextual conditionality.
This helps explain some of the puzzles of political behaviour, i.e. why
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some individuals oppose policies that both benefit them individually and
align with their cultural predispositions. A focus on context adds
explanatory power to these individual views. Our findings have severe
implications for both research and policy making. First, our approach
provides leverage to the long-standing debate about the relative explana-
tory power of rational choice and cultural approaches. Context influen-
ces the ways in which a decision is framed, which has a direct effect on
attitude formation and decision making. Individuals’ cost–benefit analy-
ses of European integration and its various policies are not consistent
across different member states. Equally, the concept of collective identity
and its effect on EU policy approval also varies depending on country.
In poorer EU member states, context serves as a heuristic, which is
strong enough to dampen the effects of utility and identity. Our model
calls for a significant re-evaluation of two key theories of political
behaviour and EU preference formation. This is very important, as cur-
rent literature has prioritised the identity/cosmopolitanism perspective
in explaining such preferences (e.g. Bechtel et al. 2014; Kuhn et al. 2017;
Verhaegen 2018), which plays no significant role in poorer EU member
states. Although citizens in countries with low wealth levels tend to be
recipients of EU financial assistance, they are less willing to support
such initiatives – a relationship that is also evident among countries that
have benefited from EU aid. Our work endeavours to initiate a new
research agenda that examines preferences for financial assistance not
only in richer but also in poorer EU member states. Thus far, case study
research on preferences for transnational financial assistance focuses on
Germany (Bechtel et al. 2014, 2017; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018; see also
Kuhn et al. 2017 on Germany and the UK), arguing that ‘the bailouts
have faced significant popular backlash in donor countries as voters
denounced the transfer of billions of taxpayer funds to prop up other
countries’ economies’ (Bechtel et al. 2017: 864). We have shown that
opposition may also be found in poorer member states, which are
potential or actual recipients of these funds. Our results demonstrate
that the dynamics of support for such initiatives might be different in
these member states and that findings related to Germany might not be
directly applicable in such contexts. Future research should therefore
also investigate preferences for transnational financial assistance in other
EU member states.
Second, our results place an important caveat on existing research. On
the one hand, citizens living in core EU member states tend to prefer
institutional integration over Eurobonds, as a means of limiting their fis-
cal exposure to weaker countries (Nicoli 2019), i.e. a form of ‘conditional
solidarity’. On the other hand, citizens living in crisis-ridden countries
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view further EU economic governance integration – i.e. EU supervision of
national budgets, policy coordination and the creation of a finance minis-
ter – as a way out of the crisis. They tend to prefer Eurobonds instead
because the latter decrease their countries’ borrowing risks and costs
(Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Nicoli 2019). However, we show that citizens
in poorer member states might also associate economic governance with
austerity and fiscal supervision and thus oppose aspects of it. They tend
to view the question of financial assistance as a potential obligation of
wealthy nations to address EU-level structural imbalances by bearing the
costs of bailing out countries in crisis. In poorer countries with budgetary
constraints, the additional risk of austerity serves to further undermine
solidarity. Taken together, these findings illustrate conflicting attitudes
towards the various dimensions of EU fiscal cooperation and suggest that
EU political initiatives on such issues may suffer a two-fold challenge.
First, in richer member states, support for economic governance and fiscal
solidarity might weaken given the strong presence of far-right Eurosceptic
parties that politicise issues of deservingness across borders. Second, in
poor countries that are potential recipients of EU funds, burden-sharing
may not be considered as their primary responsibility, which may ultim-
ately further solidify the idea that questions of economic malaise should
be addressed at the domestic level. For example, the poor–rich distinction
allows us to contextualise the result of the 2015 Greek referendum on
whether the country would accept the proposals of the EU/IMF. Despite
the dual potential risk of default and Grexit, citizens rejected the lenders’
reform plans. The main reason behind the result related to opposition to
externally imposed austerity, and a general feeling that a ‘No’ vote would
ultimately lead to renewed negotiations (Tsatsanis and Teperoglou 2016).
European solidarity, of course, is a multidimensional phenomenon that
differs from national solidarity (Baute et al. 2018; Nicoli 2015). With spe-
cific reference to within-EU financial assistance, it should be noted that
systemic resilience is contingent upon common solutions, cross-national
unity, and the understanding of mutual responsibility and interdepend-
ence (see also Ferrera and Burelli 2019). This in part depends on the
extent to which rich countries’ solidarity is perceived as ‘conditional’, i.e.
tied to conditionality and austerity, and promoting political inequality
through a distinction between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’. It equally
depends on the political willingness of poorer member states to position
themselves at the heart of European integration and also engage in some
form of risk sharing. Our findings indicate that to ensure popular accept-
ance of new cross-European initiatives, therefore, political elites may need
to frame the need for financial assistance differently, depending on coun-
try wealth. Such policies are more likely to succeed if initiated,
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spearheaded and promoted by political actors across the union, rather
than solely from richer ‘motor’ EU member states.
Finally, we show that the same individuals in different countries might
support European integration but may not be prepared to support costly
policies. In doing so, we highlight the importance of examining
Euroscepticism going beyond questions of general ‘diffuse’ support for the
system. Investigating attitudes towards EU issues as objects of ‘specific’
support reveals that there are different constellations of preferences on
different policy domains. This suggests that the ‘winner–loser’ structure is
uniform neither across EU member states nor across policy areas
(Vasilopoulou and Talving 2019), and points to the challenge of address-
ing Euroscepticism with a one-size-fits-all strategy.
Notes
1. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/91/financial-assistance-to-
eu-member-states (accessed 30 July 2018).
2. https://www.ft.com/content/6ee25cc2-f3e6-11e0-b221-00144feab49a (accessed
20 June 2017).
3. Note that in the context of domestic redistribution, citizens of lower
socioeconomic status tend to support redistributive policies (Alesina and La
Ferrara 2005; Corneo and Gr€uner 2002).
4. The recoding enables us to carry out a comparison with an alternative
dependent variable, i.e. the EU membership question.
5. The correlation remains weak (r¼ 0.32) if we correlate the variables using
their original scales.
6. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm (accessed 14 August 2018).
7. These countries include Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal,
Romania and Spain (source: https://ec.europa.eu).
8. All results remain robust if we run the models using the original categorical
coding of the dependent variable (Online Appendix A4).
9. The results are substantively in a similar direction when domestic context is
measured using unemployment rate or GDP per capita change from the
crisis year (Online Appendix A3).
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